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THE "LAW"/" POLITICS"

DISTINCTION IN THE
COLONIAL/POSTCOLONIAL
CONTEXT
KUNAL M. PARKER*
In one sense, and most generally, one might say that all of these
papers are about, in one way or another, the law's power to produce
certain kinds of identities. One could of course observe that the
identities at stake in the different papers are very different from each
other, shaped as they are by very different historical, political and
social circumstances. However, that would not detract significantly
from the fundamental correctness of grouping these papers under
the rubric of law and identity.
These days, it seems that one cannot turn anywhere within the
legal academy without running into the idea that the law is
fundamentally involved in the production of identities, rather than in
the repression of already existing identities, and that this production
of identities is deeply political. In this mode of understanding the
relationship between law and identity, there is of course a certain
kind of relationship being worked out with the writings of Michel
Foucault, which one associates fundamentally with the idea of
productive power.
However, because we are, so to speak, among friends- and
because we all agree that the law does in fact have a great deal to do
with the production of identities - I thought it might be more
productive to move beyond that question. Of the many different
points of departure that one could adopt here, I shall choose to focus
" Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. B.A., J.D., Harvard University, Ph.D. Candidate, Princeton
University.
1. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M.
Sheridan trans., 1985); DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan

Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978).
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upon the distinction between " law" and "politics." This distinction, I
submit, is particularly important in the colonial/postcolonial
situation, and often grievously under-explored.
We all know that "law" is political, but I think that something we
need to know more about- once again particularly in the
colonial/postcolonial situation- is the way in which the discursive
domain of "law" developed- indeed, continues to develop- in
relation to the discursive domain of "politics." In other words, what
made something a "legal" question as opposed to a "political"
question, and how might the relationship between certain kinds of
"legal" - as opposed
to
"political" - activities change our
understanding of colonial history or, today, inform our
understanding of legal practice?
Let me illustrate something of what I mean with an example drawn
from Indian colonial history. First, a somewhat lengthy digression
into the historiography of Indian nationalism and the "women's
question." I draw here upon the work of Partha Chatterjee, who has
written very extensively, and certainly most influentially, about these
questions. 2 Chatterjee poses the question of why the "women's
question" which so deeply occupied Indian social reformers
throughout the nineteenth century- for example, through debates
over sati, 3 widow remarriage, the Rakhmabai case, 4 the "age of

consent" controversy- disappeared from public debate towards the
end of the nineteenth century.5 Rejecting the responses of liberal
historians (who interpret the disappearance of such debates as the
occlusion of women's issues by the rise of an atavistic nationalism),
Chatterjee argues instead that Indian/Hindu nationalism located the
"women's question" within "an inner domain of sovereignty, far
removed from the arena of political contest with the colonial state
[where] [t] his inner domain of national culture was constituted in
2. See, e.g., PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES (1993).
3. See V. Venkatesan, The Law, and the Facts, FRONTLINE, Nov. 27-Dec. 10, 1999

(defining sati under the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, as the "act of
burning or burying alive any widow along with the body of her deceased husband or
any other relative ...whether the widow voluntarily submits herself to such burning
or

burying

or

is

coerced

or

persuaded

into

doing

so."),

available at

http://www.flonnet.com/fll625/16250280.htm
4. See Mahesh Vijapurkar, The Doctor Who Opposed Child Marriage,THE HINDUONLINE ED. OF INDIA'S NAT'L NEWSPAPER, July 4, 2001 (providing background on Dr.
Rakhmabai, who was married without her consent when she was ten years old,

became a doctor ten years later, and successfully resisted her husband's demand for
restoration
of
conjugal
rights),
available
at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/07/04/stories/ 0204000n.htm.
5. See CHATTERJEE, supra note 2, at 116.
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the light of the discovery of 'tradition'" . This took place through a
new coding of the familiar distinction between the "world" and the
"home." I quote at length a very familiar passage from Chatterjee's
work:
The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and
home corresponded, had acquired... a very special significance in
the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power
had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its
superior material culture, had subjugated them.
But, the
nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential,
identity of the East, which lay in its distinctive, and superior,
spiritual culture. Here the East was undominated, sovereign,
master of its own fate. For a colonized people, the world was a
distressing constraint, forced upon it by the fact of its material
weakness. It was a place of oppression and daily humiliation, a
place where the norms of the colonizer had perforce to be
accepted. It was also the place, as nationalists were soon to argue,
where the battle would be waged for national independence. The
subjugated must learn the modem sciences and arts of the material
world from the West in order to match their strengths and
ultimately overthrow the colonizer. But in the entire phase of the
national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve, and
strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual
essence. No encroachments by the colonizer must be allowed in
that inner sanctum. In the world, imitation of and adaptation to
Western norms was a necessity; at home, they were tantamount to
annihilation of one's very identity.
As might be expected, the "inner" is coded as female, the "outer"
as male, so that men are soiled by their necessary negotiation of the
"outer" imposed by colonialism and women represent the "inner,"
coming thereby to play a very special role in symbolizing, preserving,
and perpetuating the nation. In this regard, Chatterjee points out
that a "new" or "enlightened" patriarchy comes to define this
woman representing the inner "autonomous" domain:
The new woman defined in this way was subjected to a new
patriarchy. In fact, the social order connecting the home and the
world in which nationalists placed the new woman was contrasted
not only with that of modem Western society; it was explicitly
distinguished from the patriarchy of indigenous tradition, the same
tradition that had been put on the dock by colonial interrogators.
Sure enough, nationalism adopted several elements from tradition
6. CHATrERJEE, supra note 2, at 117.
7. CHATTERJEE, supra note 2, at 120-21.
8. CHATREJEE, supra note 2, at 121.
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as marks of its native cultural identity, but this was now a
"classicized" tradition- reformed, reconstructed, fortified
against
charges of barbarism and irrationality.
The new patriarchy was also sharply distinguished from the
immediate social and cultural condition in which the majority of
the people lived, for the "new" woman was quite the reverse of the
"common" woman, who was coarse, vulgar, loud, quarrelsome,
devoid of superior moral sense, sexually promiscuous, subjected to
brutal physical oppression by males... It was precisely this
degenerate condition of women that nationalism claimed it would
9
reform ....
Thus, Chatterjee explains both (i) the disappearance of the
"women's question" from late Nineteenth century public discourse 0
and (ii) the passage of the Hindu Code in the post-Independence
period in terms of this nationalist arrogation of claims over
Indian/Hindu women, who were made to inhabit the space of the
sovereign, untainted "tradition" that would be removed from
negotiation with the colonial state, on the one hand, and imposed
upon all kinds of women in the post-Independence period, on the
other hand.
My object in citing Chatterjee's work so extensively is to show how
even the most brilliant historian of Indian nationalism fails to
distinguish adequately between "politics" and "law."
Chatterjee is
correct to observe that certain kinds of "political" issues having to do
with gender reform disappeared from the public arena as nationalist
discourse increasingly made the "women's question" one that was
internal to the nation, and hence something that was not up for
negotiation with the colonial state.' 2 However, what Chatterjee fails
to notice is that certain kinds of "legal" issues having to do with
gender reform-which wreaked havoc upon the lives of various
subaltern women in Nineteenth century India-continued to take
place, and were even enthusiastically applauded within certain kinds
of nationalist discourse. How then is one to explain the coexistence
of (i) the disappearance of frontal assaults upon the Anglo-Hindu
law- sad, widow remarriage, the Rakhmabai case, the age of consent
9. CHATTERJEE, supra note 2, at 127.
10. See CHATTERJEE, supra note 2, at 132 (asserting that "female emancipation"
disappeared from the public agenda because of the "refusal of nationalism to make
the women's question an issue of political negotiation with the colonial state" ).
11. See CHATTERJEE, supra note 2, at 133 (noting that, while after independence it
became legitimate to carry out social reform through marriage rules, property rights,
and equal opportunity, the women's question has once again become a political
issue).
12. CHATTERJEE, supra note 2, at 132.
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issue, and so on- from the arena of colonial public debate and (ii)
the judicial " reformist" onslaught against various subaltern women
that took place with the approbation of nationalists? Although much
could be said with respect to this question, for my purposes here, this
has much to do with the discursive construction of the domains of
"politics" and " law."
This idea is all-too familiar to all Anglo-American legal historians.
For example, the distinction between "politics" and law" has been
explored productively in the context of capital-labor relations in
Nineteenth century America to explain how explicitly "political"
questions relating to the claims of labor were removed from the
arena of "politics," transformed into "legal" questions, and displaced
into the arena of "law," where
they could be contained within the
13
intricacies of legal doctrine.
However, the historical development of the distinction between
"politics" and "law" has not been adequately studied in the context
of colonial India, and it can and should be studied. Certain kinds of
highly public "reformist" activity surrounding women clearly
occupied the realm of "politics," and therefore disappeared as
nationalist discourse removed the "women's question" from the
realm of contestation with the colonial state.
Other kinds of
surreptitious judicial "reformist" activity surrounding women clearly
occupied the realm of "law," and therefore continued to flourish
even as nationalist discourse claimed Indian/Hindu women for itself.
The fact that nationalist discourse never attempted to save the latter
women from the colonial state, even as it erased such women- as
well as its debts to colonial law- from national history is telling
insofar as it exposes the way in which the realms of "politics" and
"law" are constructed in the context of "negotiated independence"
in postcolonial India. I will leave out, for reasons of length, the
implication of this understanding for the "personal laws" debate in
contemporary India, which is a debate that flares up over and over
again.
My objective in drawing attention to the distinction between the
discursive construction of the domains of "politics" and "law" is not
to show that oppressive things can be done surreptitiously through
"law" when they cannot be done through "politics." Neither is it my
objective to invoke the idea of the "relative autonomy of law."
Neither is it my object to insist upon the difference of law, as if lawlike art in Adorno's aesthetic theory- always exists beyond everything
13. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINs, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993).
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else, such that all that is left is one's own ferocious insistence on
producing the difference of law (while insisting upon one's Marxist
credentials at the same time).14 In other words, I am not pushing any
particular agenda in suggesting that it might be interesting to explore
the discursive development of "law" and "politics." Instead, my aim
is to urge the presenters of the papers to consider how, why and
when "law" and "politics" separate from each other in the specific
contexts that they explore, and to examine how that separation
"works" in the specific contexts of the pasts and presents that
they
are interested in because that work urgently needs to be done for the
colonial/postcolonial world. I hope that these brief remarks might
serve as the basis for a discussion of these wonderful papers.

14. See generally THEODOR W. ADORNO, AESTHETIC THEORY (Gretel Adorno & Rolf
Tiedemann eds., C. Lenhardt trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984).

